Creativity and Blocking: No Evidence for an Association by Zaksaite, T et al.
 133 
AVANT, Vol. VIII, Special Issue 
ISBN: 978-83-944622-04-6 avant.edu.pl/en 
DOI: 10.26913/80s02017.0111.0013 
 
Creativity and Blocking: 
No Evidence for an Association 
 
Tara Zaksaite1  , Peter M. Jones2  , and Chris J. Mitchell2 
1 The Open University, UK  
2 Plymouth University, UK 
* corresponding author  gintare.zaksaite-@-open.ac.uk 
 
Received 14 April 2017; accepted 26 September 2017; published 21 November 2017. 
 
Abstract 
Creativity is an important quality that has been linked with problem solving, achieve-
ment, and scientific advancement. It has previously been proposed that creative in-
dividuals pay greater attention to and are able to utilize information that others may 
consider irrelevant, in order to generate creative ideas (e.g., Eysenck, 1995). In this 
study we investigated whether there was a relationship between creativity and 
greater learning about irrelevant information. To answer this question, we used a 
self-report measure of creative ideation and a blocking task, which involved learning 
about irrelevant stimuli. We failed to find evidence for this association, with a Bayes 
Factor indicating support for no relationship between these measures. While it is 
possible that a different measure of creative ideation, for example one which does 
not rely on self-report, may produce different results, a more lucrative research di-
rection may be focusing on the link between creativity and cognitive flexibility, in 
line with suggestions by Zabelina and Robinson (2010). 
Keywords: learning; creativity; creative ideation; Runco Ideational Behavior Scale; 
blocking. 
 
Creativity and Blocking: No Evidence for an Association 
Creativity is an important quality which has value in problem solving (Sawyer, 2012), 
education (Lewis, 2009), and has been related to advancements in engineering, 
mathematics, and technology (e.g., Plucker, Beghetto, & Dow, 2004). Thus, it is im-
portant to study creativity in order to identify people, properties and circumstances 
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associated with it, to investigate the possibility of maximizing related positive out-
comes and recognize any associated risks. It has been previously suggested that cre-
ative people pay greater attention to irrelevant information (e.g., Ey ⁠senck, 1995; 
Kasof, 1997; Mendelsohn & Griswold, 1966). Because attention guides learning 
(Mackintosh, 1975), this should result in creative people learning more about irrele-
vant information. This manuscript investigated whether a measure of creativity was 
related to greater learning about irrelevant stimuli within a causal learning task. 
Causal learning describes a process of acquiring associations between causes and 
outcomes, allowing people to react appropriately to changes in their environment, 
predict events, and conserve resources. For example, a causal association may be 
learned between eating a food and getting a stomach ache, or between pressing a 
button and sound coming from a radio. A key question within associative learning is 
what determines the var ⁠iability in the acquisition of such associations. Influential 
theories of associative learning have incorporated attention (e.g., Mackintosh, 1975; 
Pearce & Hall, 1980). In particular, learning and attention have been shown to be 
greater for cues which predict their consequences very well, compared with cues 
which predict their consequences poorly (e.g., Le Pelley & McLaren, 2001, 2003, 
2004; Le Pelley, Mitchell, Beesley, George, & Wills, 2016; Le Pelley, Vadillo, & Luque, 
2013; Lochmann & Wills, 2003).  
Attentional processes have also been implicated in creativity. It has been hypothe-
sized that individuals high in creativity will exhibit defocused attention, also referred 
to as an “over-inclusive thinking style”; they will be more able to connect distant ideas 
and concepts and utilize information that others might consider irrelevant. For exam-
ple, Dykes and McGhie (1976) found that participants high in creativity were better 
at remembering auditory stimuli that were instructed as irrelevant. This defocused 
attention is proposed to facilitate the idea-generation process of creativity (e.g., 
Ansburg & Hill, 2003; Eysenck, 1995; Kasof, 1997; Mendelsohn & Griswold, 1966). 
Furthermore, creativity and performance in causal learning tasks have been linked. 
It has been found that individuals scoring high on creativity measures will exhibit 
greater learning about irrelevant stimuli than individuals scoring low in creativity. 
This has been evidenced by performance on latent inhibition tasks, involving learn-
ing about irrelevant stimuli (e.g., Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2003; Kéri, 2011; 
Meyersburg, Carson, Mathis, & McNally, 2014; Peterson, Smith, & Carson, 2002). In 
a latent inhibition task, participants experience a repeated presentation of a stimu-
lus (e.g., an image of a food) by itself. When this stimulus is later paired with an 
outcome (e.g., an allergic reaction), learning for this association is slower than for 
an association involving a novel stimulus. This is referred to as a latent inhibition 
effect (Lubow & Moore, 1959). Latent inhibition effect has been found to be smaller 
in individuals who score high on creativity measures than those who score low, thus 
supporting the assertion that individuals high in creativity will pay more attention 
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to irrelevant stimuli. In other words, individuals who are highly creative learn to 
treat irrelevant in ⁠for⁠mation as more relevant, than individuals who are less crea-
tive. Given the attentional links with both causal learning and creativity, differences 
in attention may be one reason for these findings.  
While traditionally, the latent inhibition effect has been thought to be due to attention 
(e.g., Lubow, Alek, & Arzy, 1975; Lubow, Schnur, & Rifkin, 1976), alternative accounts 
have been proposed (e.g., Holmes & Harris, 2010). In order to investigate whether an 
attentional link between causal learning and creativity exists, in this experiment we 
used a different type of learning effect related to irrelevant cues, known as blocking 
(Kamin, 1969; Dickinson, Shanks, & Evenden, 1984). Blocking was selected due to its 
more established links with attention (e.g., Wills, Lavric, Croft, & Hodgson, 2007). An 
example of a blocked stimulus is stimulus B on A+ and AB+ trials, on which stimulus 
A predicts the outcome, and A and B together predict the same outcome. For example, 
participants may be told that a fictional patient gets a food poisoning after eating ap-
ples (A+), and they get a food poisoning after eating apples and bananas together 
(AB+). Stimulus B is redundant, because its companion, stimulus A, predicts the out-
come perfectly on A+ and AB+ trials. Dickinson et al. (1984) found that B was thought 
to have caused the outcome to a lesser extent in a group which received A+/AB+ train-
ing than in a group for which A+ trials were omitted (AB+). In the same group of par-
ticipants, the finding that B is thought to cause the outcome to a lesser extent than D 
on A+/AB+/CD+ trials is referred to as the blocking effect.  
Given the earlier proposed link between higher creativity and greater learning about 
irrelevant cues, we may expect that participants high in creativity would produce a 
smaller blocking effect. In order to measure creativity, we chose a measure relating 
to creative ideation, or ability to generate creative ideas. Because defocused atten-
tion has theoretically been proposed to enable individuals to generate creative ideas 
(e.g., Ansburg & Hill, 2003; Eysenck, 1995; Kasof, 1997; Mendelsohn & Griswold, 
1966), such a measure should be best placed to detect a relationship between learn-
ing for irrelevant cues and creative-idea generation. 
This is what we aimed to investigate in this experiment. Participants were asked to 
complete a learning task which included trial types necessary for blocking (Table 1). 
We also asked participants to complete a questionnaire of creative ideation, the 
Runco Ideational Behavior Scale (RIBS-S; Runco et al., 2014). This measure was cho-
sen due to its focus on the process of generating novel ideas. We investigated 
whether there was a relationship between the size of the blocking effect displayed 
by the participants and their RIBS-S score.  
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Table 1. The design of the learning task. The letters A–J represent different stimuli; 
“+” represents food poisoning and “–” an absence of food poisoning. 
Stage 1 Stage 2 Test 
A+ AB+ A, B 
 CD+ C, D 
E– EF+ E, F 
GH+ K+ K 
 L– L 
IJ– IJ– I, J 
 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
126 participants in total assisted with this study (110 were female). They were 
aged 18–42 (M = 20.46, SD = 3.86). They took part as a course requirement at 
Plym ⁠outh University. The study was described as an investigation into learning and 
personality. Inclusion criteria required participants to be over 18 years old, fluent in 
English, and have normal or corrected-to-normal vision and color vision.  
 
Materials 
The experiment was presented on a 22-inch desktop computer screen with a 
1920 x 1080 resolution. The blocking task was designed, presented, and responses 
were recorded, using E-prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools, PA, US). The 
questionnaire was designed and the associated data collected using Survey Monkey 
survey engine. 
 
Blocking task. The foods used in the blocking task were asparagus, aubergine, avo-
cado, carrots, cauliflower, lentils, mushroom, onion, pear, potato, pumpkin, and wa-
termelon, which were randomly assigned to cues A–J for each participant. The 
outcomes were food poisoning and no food poisoning.  
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Runco Ideational Behavior Scale: Short form (RIBS-S; Runco et al., 2014). This 
measure contained 19 statements, which relate to specific examples of everyday cre-
ative ideation (e.g., “I have ideas for arranging or rearranging the furniture at home”). 
Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which these statements applied to 
them on a 0 (Never) to 4 (Daily) response scale, with a total possible score of 76.  
 
Procedure 
The order of completion for the RIBS-S and the learning task was counterbalanced, 
with half of the participants completing the learning task followed by the RIBS-S 
measure and the other half vice versa.  
The blocking task was self-paced. An allergist scenario was used for the blocking 
task, commonly used in associative learning experiments (e.g. , Aitken, Larkin & 
Dickinson, 2000). Participants were asked to imagine that they were diagnosing 
allergic reactions in a fictional patient. They were asked to observe which foods the 
patient ate and whether they experienced an allergic reaction or not. Images of 
foods sized 300 x 300 with text captions above were presented on the screen with 
black background, below the text “Patient eats the following food(s)”: When a trial 
consisted of one image, this was presented at the center of the screen, while on 
trials with two images, one was presented on the left and one on the right. The 
outcomes were food poisoning, signified by text “The patient has food poisoning” 
and a sad face, and no food poisoning, signified by text “The patient has no food 
poisoning” and a smiley face. On each trial, participants were asked to rate the stim-
uli for their likelihood of food poisoning, on a scale of 1–9 (1 = safe; 5 = uncertain; 
9 = dangerous). The scale was presented below the images, at the bottom of the 
screen and partic ⁠ipants responded by clicking the appropriate number with a 
mouse. Immediate feedback followed with the appropriate outcome. The feedback 
was displayed on the screen for 3000 ms. The progression to the next trial was 
immediate. Stage 1 consisted of 10 blocks of 4 trial types (A+, E–, GH+, IJ–), and 
Stage 2 of 5 blocks of 6 trial types (AB+, CD+, EF+, IJ–, K+, L–). The transition from 
Stage 1 to Stage 2 was seamless. At test, participants were asked to rate individual 
foods presented in Stage 2 on the same 9-point scale but received no feedback; each 
food was rated twice at test.  
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Results 
Learning 
Responses in Stage 1, averaged across participants, are presented in Figure 1, and re-
sponses in Stage 2 are presented in Figure 2. These figures illustrate that participants 
were able to learn the pairings.  
   
Figure 1. Responses in Stage 1. 
Figure 2. Responses in Stage 2. 
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Test 
Ratings for each cue at test are shown in Figure 3. A one-way ANOVA revealed a signifi-
cant effect of cue, F(3.13, 391.33) = 471.09, p < .001, η2 = .79. Ratings for C/D were 
greater than ratings for B, indicating that blocking was observed, t(125) = 4.41, p < .001. 
 
Next we calculated a blocking-magnitude score for each participant by taking away rat-
ings for B from ratings for C/D. In order to investigate whether there was a relationship 
between blocking and RIBS-S scores, a Pearson correlation coefficient was computed. 
This was not significant, r(126) = –.022, p = .809, BF01 = 8.72 (Figure 4), indicating that 
there was no relationship between the magnitude of blocking and RIBS-S scores.  
  
Figure 3. Mean causal ratings at test for each stimulus. Ratings for C and D, 
and I and J were collapsed because these cues were treated equivalently. 
Figure 4. Correlation between blocking magnitude (ratings for C and D – ratings for B) 
and RIBS-S score. 
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Discussion 
In this experiment we set out to investigate whether the magnitude of blocking, an 
effect related to learning about irrelevant cues, was related to creative ideation. It 
has previously been proposed that creative people pay more attention to and are able 
to utilize irrelevant information in order to generate creative ideas (e.g., Ansburg & 
Hill, 2003; Eysenck, 1995; Mendelsohn & Griswold, 1966), exhibiting a trait referred 
to as defocused attention. However, we did not find evidence to suggest that partici-
pants’ scores on a measure of creative ideation were related to how much they 
learned about the blocked cue; the correlation between RIBS-S and blocking magni-
tude was near zero, with the Bayes Factor indicating support for the null hypothesis. 
Overall, our findings did not support a link between greater learning about irrelevant 
information and ability to generate creative ideas. If the link between defocused at-
tention and creativity exists, a relationship between these measures would have 
been expected. However, we do acknowledge the possibility that a different type of 
measure for coming up with creative ideas, perhaps one that does not rely on self-
report, e.g., divergent thinking, may produce different results; others may wish to 
investigate this further. However, it is worth noting that Runco et al. (2014) reported 
a strong positive relationship between participants’ scores on RIBS-S and perfor-
mance on divergent thinking tasks.  
If no relationship between these measures exists, then how may these findings be 
reconciled with previous results? After all, several previous studies have indicated 
relationship between reduced latent inhibition and creativity (e.g., Carson et al., 
2003; Kéri, 2011; Meyersburg et al., 2014; Peterson et al., 2002). One reason for the 
differential results may be differences between blocking and latent inhibition tasks. 
For example, blocking is usually estimated once learning for the cues is complete; 
participants are asked to provide ratings for how predictive a blocked versus a con-
trol stimulus is (e.g., Aitken, Larkin, & Dickinson, 2000). On the other hand, latent 
inhibition often involves time taken to detect a predictive relationship between an 
incidental stimulus (e.g., the background color of the screen) and an element of the 
task. It is possible that creativity may be related to faster detection of a causal rela-
tionship rather than to attributing greater causality to irrelevant information.  
Another difference between the previous studies and the current one is that they fo-
cused on creative achievement and personality whereas the present study focused on 
creative ideation. Arguably, creative achievement is the end result of creative ideation. 
Therefore it is possible that greater learning about irrelevant cues may be related to 
a different stage of creativity and not generating creative ideas specifically. In this 
case, defocused attention may still be related to creativity, but may only be exhibited 
by creative individuals under particular circumstances. In other words, there will be 
times when creative people can exhibit defocused attention, but this will not neces-
sarily be stable throughout time. For example, this may only occur when people are 
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directly involved in a creative activity, e.g., writing a piece of music. In relation to this, 
Zabelina and Robinson (2010) proposed that creative people, rather than exhibiting 
defocused attention, are able to utilize both defocused and focused attention, and 
switch between these two modes of attention as necessary. They referred to this abil-
ity as flexible cognitive control. In their study, they found that participants who scored 
highly on measures of creativity exhibited fewer reaction-time costs in a Stroop task 
on a trial-by-trial basis. A link between creativity and cognitive flexibility has also 
been reported by others (e.g., Chen et al., 2014; de Dreu, Nijstad, & Baas, 2011). Given 
this link, it may be expected that creative participants will outperform others in 
other associative learning tasks which involve attentional switching. One example of 
this is intra-dimensional/extra-dimensional (ID/ED) shift (George & Pearce, 1999; 
Mackin⁠tosh & Little, 1969; Shepp & Eimas, 1964). In such a task, participants are pre-
sented with stimuli which vary on several dimensions, for example: color and shape. 
They are asked to sort these stimuli into categories and receive corrective feedback. 
Over time, they learn that one particular dimension, e.g., color, is relevant and deter-
mines the categories. In the next part of the experiment, participants are presented 
with a different set of stimuli. In this part, for some stimuli, the dimension which de-
termines the categories changes, and a previously irrelevant dimension determines 
the category, e.g., shape. It has been found that participants incur switching costs, tak-
ing longer to learn to categorize stimuli correctly when they are classified based on 
the previously irrelevant, versus the previously relevant, dimension. If Zabelina and 
Robinson’s suggestions are correct, then participants who are more creative should 
exhibit lower switching costs than those who are less creative.  
However, it is worth noting that creative processes may be the result of a different 
combination of focused and defocused attention than proposed by Zabelina and 
Rob⁠inson (2010), such that instead of creative participants exhibiting one extreme 
at any one time, they may utilize both at the same time. For a discussion of this alter-
native view of cognitive flexibility, please see Ionescu (2012).  
To conclude, this experiment investigated whether there was a link between a meas-
ure of creative ideation, RIBS-S, and learning for irrelevant cues using a blocking par-
adigm. We failed to demonstrate this link. Given the theoretical link proposed 
between defocused attention and creativity (e.g., Eysenck, 1995; Kasof, 1997; Men-
delsohn & Griswold, 1966), this link would have been expected. Further studies may 
wish to investigate whether blocking is related to divergent thinking, and whether 
creativity may be related to switching performance on an ID/ED task.  
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